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Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy
Laura S. Underkuffler ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Reconciling the federal constitutional guarantee of religious free
exercise1 with the collective interests of civil society has long been a
difficult problem for First Amendment jurisprudence. For many
years, the United States Supreme Court protected claimed religious
exercise if it was required by a central religious belief, was
substantially burdened by government action, and was not
outweighed by a compelling state interest.2 The last prong of this
test, in particular, afforded substantial protection to claimed religious
exercise when pitted against state laws.3
In Employment Division v. Smith,4 decided little more than a
decade ago, the Court abruptly shifted course. Citing the dangers
posed to societal norms by claimed religious exemptions, the Court
held that the government need only show that a challenged law has
no “antireligious bias,” that is, that religious and nonreligious
individuals and actions are treated equally in intention and effect. If a
law is “neutral” in this sense, the fact that it incidentally burdens
religious conduct presents no First Amendment problem.5
The holding in Smith—essentially, that religious exercise has no
special rights or immunity from “neutral, generally applicable
law[s]”6—sits uneasily with another longstanding doctrinal fixture,
∗ Professor, Duke University School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 717–19 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that religious beliefs
requiring the discontinuance of a child’s education after the eighth grade of elementary school
must be given precedence over the state’s competing interest in universal childhood
education).
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–90; Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449–52 (1988).
6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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namely, that of “religious-group autonomy.” This doctrine, which
has developed in a piecemeal fashion over the years, generally holds
that religious groups and institutions are exempt from secular state
interference in their selection of clergy, internal doctrinal and
property disputes, and other matters that affect their internal
organization and internal relations.7 As Professor Perry Dane states
in his contribution to this Conference, areas of claimed autonomous
exercise “rang[e] from classic church property disputes to more
recently developing questions over the extent to which various
regulatory regimes, including labor law, civil rights law, and even
malpractice, defamation, and contract law, should be permitted to
intervene in the internal relations of religious institutions and
communities.”8
Thus, the question that immediately arises is this: If religious
individuals are precluded by Smith from claiming broad immunity
from civil laws and civil courts, can religious groups and institutions
continue to claim that immunity, under the doctrine of religiousgroup autonomy?
The theoretical grounding for the doctrine of religious-group
autonomy in Supreme Court jurisprudence is far from clear.
Although the Court has often discussed religious-group autonomy in
terms that echo First Amendment values,9 the Court has never

7. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)
(stating that civil courts must defer to church tribunals on matters of purely ecclesiastical
concern, such as disputes over church discipline, choice of clergy, and diocesan
reorganization); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952) (stating that in the context of a church property dispute, religious
organizations are entitled to “a spirit of freedom . . . , an independence from secular control
and manipulation . . . , [and] power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine”); Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872) (stating that in the context of a church property dispute,
courts must defer to religious tribunals on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law”).
8. Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715, 1733–34 (footnotes
omitted). For examples of more far-flung claims, see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (claimed exemption from state civil rights laws);
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (claimed exemption from the Americans
with Disabilities Act); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990)
(claimed exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act); St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp. v. NLRB,
708 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1983) (claimed exemption from the National Labor Relations Act).
9. See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110 (the idea of church autonomy is grounded in a
“rule of separation between church and state”); Watson, 80 U.S. at 730 (“‘The structure of
our government has . . . rescued . . . temporal institutions from religious interference . . . [and]

1774

3UND-FIN

1773]

12/2/2004 10:53 PM

Smith and Religious-Group Autonomy

directly addressed the scope of free exercise protections when
government interferes with religious-group affairs.10 It is therefore
difficult to deduce, as a matter of doctrinal logic, the extent to which
the Smith decision undermines the foundations of the doctrine of
religious-group autonomy. To the extent that religious-group
autonomy is intended to prevent secular meddling in religious
doctrines, ecclesiastical disputes, and other strictly internal affairs—
questions in which the secular state has no stake—the logic of Smith
may well leave the doctrine of religious-group autonomy untouched.
If, however, religious-group autonomy is extended to include
immunity from secular laws and secular policies, then its claims, and
Smith’s seeming subordination of religious exercise to “neutral
laws,” appear to be on a collision course.11
In their very interesting and provocative contributions to this
Conference, Professors Perry Dane and Kathleen Brady attempt an
answer to this question that refutes the simple assertion of Smith’s
supremacy in cases involving conflicts between group free exercise
claims and “neutral, generally applicable laws.” In different ways,
they attempt to establish why the Smith rule—which cuts far back on
the idea of religious-individual autonomy—does not necessarily have
the same impact on the claims of religious groups. Under Professor
Dane’s approach, Smith should be seen as primarily concerned with
the problem of the “subjective” and “idiosyncratic” nature of
individual free exercise exemptions—a problem that, he argues,
religious-group autonomy does not involve.12 Under Professor
Brady’s approach, religious-group autonomy survives Smith because
of its particular value for free religious exercise, which Smith
explicitly upholds.13
secured religious liberty from the invasion of civil authority.’” (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17
S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 120 (1843))).
10. See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 1633, 1635.
11. Professor Dane argues that because Smith cites certain religious-group autonomy
cases approvingly, the survival of this doctrine post-Smith is indicated. See Dane, supra note 8,
at 1716–17. However, all of the cases cited in Smith dealt with the government’s need to
refrain from involvement in internal religious disputes over ecclesiastical powers or dogma. See
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 696; Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 94). In such cases, the secular state has little interest. None dealt with the
central question in Smith, that is, religious exemptions from “otherwise neutral” state laws.
12. See Dane, supra note 8, at 1722–32.
13. See Brady, supra note 10, at 1677–79.
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Although their efforts are quite heroic and attractive in many
ways, I shall argue that they are, in the end, unconvincing. Whether
Smith’s core concern is believed to be the problem of individual,
nonreviewable, legal-definitional power, or the erosion of civil
norms, there is no convincing basis for distinguishing individual
religious exemptions, struck down in Smith, from aggressive forms of
religious-group autonomy. Nor is the ideal of individual religious
freedom necessarily furthered by the broad immunity of religious
groups from civil laws. While religious groups may be places that
nurture and sustain individual religious belief, they may also be
hostile, bitter places, which wield coercive and oppressive power.
I have never been a fan of the Smith opinion. It is my view that
freedom of religion—or freedom of conscience, as I have defined
it—has very distinct value, which is recognized in our constitutional
scheme.14 By affording individual religious exercise no special
protection, Smith denies this principle. However, frustration with
Smith should not blind us to the deep problems that an aggressive
vision of religious-group autonomy presents. The prospect of
religious groups with broad, autonomous power poses special
dangers, both to dissenting individuals and to the goals of
government, which should impel us to view it cautiously. Indeed,
our reservations about the supremacy of religious claims should, if
anything, be stronger when we consider the claims of religious
groups.
II. SMITH AND RELIGIOUS-GROUP EXEMPTIONS FROM
“OTHERWISE NEUTRAL” LAWS
In his article, “Omalous” Autonomy, Professor Dane argues that
religious-group autonomy—or a special, constitutionally required,
protective regime for religious institutions—survives Smith’s
rejection of just such a regime for individual assertions of free
religious exercise. Smith is not, in his view, the devastating case for
the idea of religious-group autonomy that one might believe.
Rather, Professor Dane sees “institutional autonomy [as] . . .

14. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Religious Guarantees in a Pluralistic Society:
Values, Problems, and Limits, 12 SA PUBLIEKREG 32, 46–47 (1997); Laura S. UnderkufflerFreund, Yoder and the Question of Equality, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 800–02 (1996); Laura S.
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational
Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 965–68 (1995).
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consistent with Smith, not only in a narrow, technical sense, but also
with respect to the bedrock principle for which Smith stands.”15
Professor Dane builds his argument in the following way. The
Court’s real concern in Smith, he argues, was not that religious
believers might be immune from civil law. Rather, the concern was
about how that immunity would be established.16 Under pre-Smith
free exercise jurisprudence, religious believers were granted
immunity from civil law based on their own determinations of their
religious beliefs. This system of “exemptions” troubled the Court.
Because judges are unable to disagree with the sincerity or
substantive truth of individual assertions of free religious exercise,17
the pre-Smith rule effectively conferred a “private right to ignore
generally applicable laws.”18 It permitted “every citizen to become a
law unto himself.”19 It violated an “essentially jurisprudential
concern” about what the rule of law should mean.20
A system of religious-group autonomy, on the other hand, does
not involve this objectionable feature. In this framework, general
categories of activities are established by law as those in which
religious groups may act autonomously. These categories are
“discrete, defined, . . . predictable,” and applicable to all.21 They are
not exemptions from law; they are provisions of law. They are
grounded in “objective, if contingent and contextual, social fact and
not merely in the subjective, idiosyncratic, claims of individuals.”22
Thus, the problem of “individual religious prerogative,” which drove
the Court’s decision in Smith, is not present in this context.
This is an argument that deserves careful evaluation. Of course,
the assertion that Smith is more concerned about the way in which
individual religious exemptions are established than about the effect

15. Dane, supra note 8, at 1721.
16. See id. at 1722–24.
17. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular [religious] beliefs or practices to a faith, or
the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”).
18. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990).
19. Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
20. Dane, supra note 8, at 1722.
21. Id. at 1735.
22. Id. at 1727.
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of religiously based exemptions on “otherwise neutral laws” is, in
itself, a controversial one. Let us assume, however, that the
placement of legal-definitional power in individual hands is, in fact,
the core concern of the Smith opinion. Is this problem avoided by
the doctrine of religious-group autonomy? Are the areas of
autonomy that this doctrine creates “discrete, defined, and
predictable” applications of law—applicable, even-handedly, to
people whom the law objectively specifies?
As Professor Brady points out, religious-group autonomy is
understood by courts and commentators in different ways. For
instance, under one understanding, religious organizations are
entitled only to exemptions from secular laws that actually burden
religious practice.23 Under a broader understanding, government
may not interfere with internal church affairs, regardless of whether
the activities affected are religious in nature or more mundane
administrative matters.24
If religious-group autonomy is understood in the first sense—if it
is understood to confer exemption from secular laws that actually
burden religious practice—then it is no more immune from
subjective, idiosyncratic, nonreviewable decisionmaking than are the
individual religious exemptions condemned in Smith. Consider, for
instance, claimed religious-group exemptions from labor laws, tort
laws, civil rights laws, and so on. The fact that we might specify the
particular areas of autonomy permitted (for example, freedom from
these laws in employee relations, if required by religious dictates)
does not eliminate the definitional power that religious groups enjoy.
What are the beliefs of this religious group? Why does the law in
question burden religious practice? Under this formulation, the
problem of “individual religious prerogative,” argued to be the core
of Smith, is simply traded for “group religious prerogative.” There is
no substantive difference, in this context, between:
•

I am exempt because my religious beliefs conflict with “law X,”
and

•

we are exempt because our religious beliefs conflict with “law X.”

23. Brady, supra note 10, at 1635.
24. Id.
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In both cases, the existence or nonexistence of the legally
recognized exemption depends upon a subjective, idiosyncratic,
nonreviewable decision: the religious beliefs that the individual—or
individuals—assert.
Suppose, however, that we understand religious-group
autonomy differently. Suppose that we understand it in the second
way described above: that government may not interfere with
internal church affairs, regardless of whether the activities are
religious in nature or mundane administrative matters. For instance,
we could recognize areas of religious-group autonomy as follows:
•

The decisions of religious organizations about the selection
and retention of employees shall be beyond the reach of civil
rights laws and other civil laws,
or

•

secular courts will not become involved in religious
organizations’ internal affairs.

Would an understanding of spheres of autonomy along these lines
avoid the problem of idiosyncratic, subjective, nonreviewable
decisionmaking?
One could certainly apply such laws without probing the
particular religious beliefs of the claiming groups, since any religious
organization that makes the claim would presumably be entitled to
the exemptions. The exemptions are indeed universal, in that sense.
Here one must pause. What we have effectively done is to
substitute status (as a “religious group”) for beliefs as the critical,
qualifying issue. If individuals have the requisite status as a religious
group or organization, then the exemption is granted. If they do not
have that status, then the exemption is denied.
Religious-group status may seem, at first blush, to be a more
objectively defined qualification than individually held religious
beliefs. However, religious-group status is itself a function of
individuals’ asserted understandings of their own (religious)
organizations, and thus—derivatively—of their own religious beliefs.
If five people declare themselves to be the New Assembly of God,
and thus a religious group entitled to autonomy, can the secular
authority challenge that assertion? If three business partners assert
themselves to be devoutly religious individuals, and their sports and
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health club business to be their “ministry,”25 can the secular
authority deny their sincerity? In fact, by choosing to be—or not to
be—a “religious group” or “organization,” as the exemption
demands, individuals retain the same idiosyncratic, subjective,
nonreviewable power that they enjoyed under the pre-Smith system
of individual religious exemptions. In neither case can the state
second-guess what is, or is not, a religiously based imperative. In
neither case can the state second-guess the sincerity of individual
religious beliefs.
Thus, the employment of a broad understanding of religiousgroup autonomy—one that simply denies government the right to
interfere with a religious group’s internal affairs, regardless of their
(religious or nonreligious) nature—does not avoid the problem of
individual, idiosyncratic, nonreviewable decisionmaking: that power
remains an inherent part of religious-group status, on which this
understanding of autonomy depends. In addition, the claim that
giving carte blanche, unqualified exemptions to religious
organizations will eliminate individually discretionary elements can
only hope to be true if the exempted activity itself is framed in very
narrow and concrete terms. Grants of religious-group autonomy that
are very limited in nature—for instance, autonomy in “hiring” or
“property disputes”—may avoid discretionary elements. But grants
of autonomy that are broad in any way—for instance, “freedom from
secular state interference in internal religious affairs”—simply retain,
in another guise, the same discretionary elements, and the same
exemptions regime.
In sum, granting religious groups autonomy for religious and
nonreligious activities of a particular kind might obscure the problem
of individual, religious-definitional authority, when the religious
organization’s claim to existence is a noncontroversial one, and when
the particular autonomy granted is narrowly defined. It does not,
however, eliminate these issues, in either a theoretical or practical
sense.
Moreover, we remain, in the end, with a nagging awareness of
the assumption with which this discussion began. Was it, in fact, the
problem of individuals’ legal-definitional power that primarily

25. See, e.g., State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (claim by profitmaking corporation run
by religiously oriented individuals for exemption from civil-rights laws).
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troubled the Smith court? Or was it a deeper concern about the
subjugation of civil laws and civil government to nonreviewable
religious norms?
If Smith’s concern was, instead, with the effect of religious
exemptions on secular laws, then the idea of religious-group
autonomy is seemingly in serious trouble. Whether exemptions are
claimed by religious individuals or religious groups, their effects on
the principle of uniform applicability of “neutral” laws are apparently
identical. Although claims of religious-group autonomy might
(under some formulations) be limited to particular settings or laws,
at the end of the day the fact remains: the religious group is, because
of its religious nature, exempt from laws that are clearly applicable to
others.
Perhaps the real question concerns the value of religious group
autonomy—a question that Professor Dane’s article does not
explicitly address. Is there, in fact, some particular characteristic of
religious-group autonomy that makes it particularly compelling? Is
there some reason to justify its retention, despite what Smith may
seem to say?
III. RELIGIOUS-GROUP AUTONOMY:
MORE VALUABLE, OR MORE DANGEROUS?
In her contribution to this Conference, Professor Brady argues
that the doctrine of religious-group autonomy survives Smith
because it furthers one of the very important principles that Smith
upholds. Professor Brady begins with the observation that the
Supreme Court has long upheld the value of religious belief and its
protection by the First Amendment.26 Smith, she argues, continues
this important recognition. “According to Smith, the ‘free exercise of
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.’”27 Although religiously
based action may be curtailed by government, “[i]n the realm of
ideas, Smith envisions unrestricted freedom.”28

26. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Freedom of thought,
which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men.”).
27. Brady, supra note 10, at 1673 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990)).
28. Id. at 1674.
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In Professor Brady’s view, Smith’s unquestioned endorsement of
the value and constitutional protection of religious belief has
profound implications for the survival of religious-group autonomy
in the post-Smith world. Numerous scholars have observed the
intimate connection between religious groups and religious belief.
“Individuals express and exercise their beliefs in religious
communities, and religious organizations also play an essential role
in shaping the beliefs that individuals hold.”29 Religious groups are,
in many ways, more than simple aggregations of the beliefs or
actions of their members. Religious groups create tradition; they “are
part of an ongoing conversation which both shapes individuals and is
shaped by them.”30 It is through living beliefs in a religious
community that beliefs are exercised, refined, and reformed.31
Furthermore, Professor Brady argues:
If religious groups play an essential role in shaping individual
religious belief and indeed in the very formulation of religious
ideas, [then] the freedom of belief that Smith envisions requires
protections for religious organizations. . . . Full freedom of belief is
not possible without a corresponding right of religious groups to
teach, develop, and practice their doctrines and ideas.32

It is the doctrine of religious-group autonomy that affords religious
groups this freedom. And because of the inherent difficulties
involved in any secular inquiry into what religious beliefs are, or the
extent to which they are sustained by groups, the “only effective and
workable” solution is to grant a broad right of autonomy to religious
groups that extends to all aspects of their affairs.33
Professor Brady candidly acknowledges that this approach will
have costs.34 Granting religious groups autonomy will have costs in
terms of the other, contrasting values and actions that the wider
community wishes to promote. However, she argues that the
opposition
between
religious-group
autonomy
and
the
implementation of democratic government is overdrawn. Religious
groups, like all citizens’ groups, are important “for sustaining a well-

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Id. at 1677.
Id. at 1698.
Id. at 1699.
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functioning democratic order.”35 They are sources for moral values
and recognition of responsibilities. They may act “[a]s training
grounds for the exercise of democratic skills.”36
It is undoubtedly true that religious groups and institutions are
important expressions of religious belief, and that they may add to
the vibrancy of a liberal democratic society. However, in the
particular context that we are considering, there are other, darker
realities with which we must reckon.
First, let us consider Professor Brady’s foundational assumption
that religious groups “nurture and sustain” individual religious
belief, making these groups deserving of protection from civil law.
This case for religious-group autonomy is grounded in the idea that
such groups are supportive and positive places for the expression and
growth of individuals’ religious faith.
Invoking this model, in this context, raises an immediate
objection. The cases in which religious groups seek freedom from
secular norms—for instance, the employment and labor relations
cases that are Professor Brady’s focus37—involve not support, but
conflict. In these cases, the religious group is not experienced by the
aggrieved person as a warm, positive, nurturing place; it is
experienced as a negative, hostile place, in which the religious group
attempts to exert, on the individual, oppressive and coercive power.
These situations involve disputes—bitter disputes; so bitter, in fact,
that individuals seek recourse in civil laws and civil courts. In these
situations, it is difficult to say that “vindicating individual religious
beliefs” is obviously achieved by granting the religious groups
complete, autonomous, and despotic power. What we have here is
the clash of individual religious beliefs, the clash of individual
religious values.
We might well believe that when the “nurturing” model applies,
our commitment to religious-group autonomy is justified. However,
when this model does not apply, should we continue, blindly, to
grant religious groups that status? Put another way, if nurturing
individual religious belief is our goal, is there a reason why the
religious beliefs and values of the many should necessarily prevail (in
effect) over the religious beliefs and values of dissenters? There is a

35. Id. at 1700.
36. Id. at 1700–01.
37. See, e.g., id. at 1645.
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tendency, by those who advocate religious-group autonomy, to
focus on the needs of the target group and its members. What about
the needs of the complainants?
There are certain situations, of course, when an aggrieved
individual’s recourse to civil laws and civil courts might—for other
reasons—quite reasonably be denied. For instance, if the individual
has voluntarily adopted the religious group’s understandings, values,
and authority, it is reasonable to expect that those understandings,
values, and authority will govern the dispute, to the exclusion of the
civil courts. As the Supreme Court has stated, “decisions of proper
church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract
or otherwise.”38 This is no different from the effect given by civil
courts to the determinations made by judicatory bodies established
by clubs, civic associations, and other private consensual
agreements.39 Indeed, this “contractarian” understanding of
religious-group autonomy explains judicial deference in many
intragroup disputes, such as those involving “ministerial,” “church
property,” and other purely ecclesiastical matters. However, neither
this contractarian theory nor the ideal of the “nurturing” group
supports a broad, across-the-board presumption of religious-group
autonomy in individual-recourse cases.
Thus, the idea of individual benefit as the reason for an
aggressive vision of religious-group autonomy is questionable at best.
In addition, religious-group autonomy involves obvious costs for
societal goals and values. We must remember the range of situations
in which claims of religious-group autonomy can arise, even under
more conservative formulations. For instance, it is often suggested
that religious-group autonomy should be granted for the groups’
“internal operations.” Although this might seem like a limited grant,
it could include fund-raising activities, the treatment of employees or
prospective employees, the operation of religious schools, and more.
Such “internal operations” of religious groups have frequent, serious,
external effects on critically important societal goals and values. With
the enforceability of civil rights laws, education standards, workplace
safety rules, and other laws at issue, it is difficult to maintain that the
38. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
39. See id. at 16–17.
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secular state has no vital interests at stake, or that religious groups
should, in their internal operations, be “islands of autonomy.”
For those who would go farther—and grant religious groups
autonomy for all operations and all affairs—the list is even more
daunting. For instance, a religious group could claim autonomy for
its land-use decisions, or conflicts with zoning, environmental, and
historic preservation laws; its commercial dealings with outside
parties (for example, contractual disputes and antifraud laws); its
political/lobbying activities, and conflicts with election laws and
anticorruption laws; and more. The list is endless. It is particularly
endless because we have not yet determined what those “religious
groups,” entitled to autonomy, will be. As observed above, claims
for exemption from civil laws on constitutional grounds have been
asserted by religious groups as diverse as a religious foundation
involved in commercial activities and a profitmaking enterprise run
by religiously oriented individuals.40 Should all of them be
autonomous in their operations, policies, and practices?
Indeed, when we think positively of the prospect of religious
groups as exempt from civil laws, we tend to imagine this power as
exercised by traditional religious groups, whose activities we admire.
What of the harder cases? What of groups who espouse and
implement religious hatred, racial hatred, the subordination of
women, the persecution of gay men and lesbians, or other beliefs
abhorrent to civil society? If autonomy is given to some religious
groups, it must, perforce, be given to all.41 Yet, we would hardly
want the activities of all such groups to be protected, untouchable,
“islands of autonomy.”
Professor Brady acknowledges that even the “internal affairs” of
religious groups can have substantial impacts upon the larger
society—some quite negative—giving the state important regulatory
interests.42 She argues, however, that “[f]ull freedom of belief, even
40. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985);
State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986). See generally, Laura S. Underkuffler, “Discrimination” on the
Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 581, 597–99 (1989).
41. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (stating that conferral of government benefits on particular religious groups
would “resurrect the very discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution sought
forever to forbid”).
42. See Brady, supra note 10, at 1699.
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unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential to the health of
democratic society[,] as are the groups that make such beliefs
possible.”43 If—by this—she means freedom of belief, and the right
to associate with like believers, I concur wholeheartedly. In those
limited areas, the democratic value of religious freedom clearly
outweighs the discomfort experienced by others, which the existence
of those beliefs may engender. Indeed, even when we consider
exemptions for individual free exercise claims, under pre-Smith law,
my sympathy with her position (on balance) continues. However,
when we consider the question of religiously motivated conduct by
religious groups, the stakes are much higher. With the religious strife
and oppression that currently engulfs vast parts of the world, the
view that religious groups should simply be left alone to do good
works seems alarmingly inadequate.
As I have stated elsewhere, I do not believe that religion is simply
another philosophical or personal belief system that should, as a
constitutional matter, be treated “equally” in the name of
“equality.”44 I believe that religion is different, both in its unique
power and value to individual lives and in its special dangers, when
mixed with government. Those of us who believe in religion’s special
value might not like Smith and thus be tempted to view any
broadening of religious freedom, for individuals or groups, as some
kind of victory. However, individual religious freedom under preSmith doctrine was a far more limited and benign construct than a
sweeping idea of religious-group autonomy. Religion, when
“combined” in groups and institutions, wields tremendous social,
economic, and political power. It carries far more dangers of
oppression, coercion, and the assumption of governmental power
than does individual free exercise. This does not mean that
government should have the power to crush religious groups, or to
dictate their truly internal affairs. But neither does it mean that we
should grant these groups carte blanche, as societal actors, by
granting them sweeping autonomy.

43. Id. at 1703.
44. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficulties and
Dangers in a Pluralistic Society, 27 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 577, 583–88 (2001); Laura S.
Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 463,
476–77 (2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, whether one believes Smith’s core concern is the
problem of individual, nonreviewable, legal-definitional power, or
the problem of the erosion of civil norms, there is no convincing
basis for distinguishing individual religious exemptions, struck down
in Smith, from aggressive forms of religious-group autonomy.
“Religious groups” are constituted by the subjective beliefs and
assertions of individuals, in a way that is no different from claims of
individual religious exercise. And if we are concerned with the
impotence of civil norms, in settings beyond those involving strictly
internal and ecclesiastical questions, there is no difference if those
norms are ignored by groups or if they are ignored by individuals.
To sustain broad visions of religious-group autonomy in the
shadow of Smith, we must find a positive reason for granting to
religious groups what the Court denied, in Smith, to individuals.
When considering a doctrinal development as radical as this, we must
carefully consider its consequences. Religious groups, with
autonomous power, pose far more dangers of individual oppression,
governmental interference, and undermining of societal norms than
autonomously acting individuals. In my view, granting religious
groups sweeping freedom from civil laws carries with it far more
costs than benefits.

1787

3UND-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1788

12/2/2004 10:53 PM

[2004

